University of Miami Law School

University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
University of Miami Business Law Review

12-13-2017

The EpiPen Problem: Analyzing Unethical Drug
Price Increases and the Need for Greater
Government Regulation
Talal Rashid

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr
Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Talal Rashid, The EpiPen Problem: Analyzing Unethical Drug Price Increases and the Need for Greater Government Regulation, 26 U. Miami
Bus. L. Rev. 129 (2017)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol26/iss1/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Miami Business Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

The EpiPen Problem: Analyzing Unethical
Drug Price Increases and the Need for
Greater Government Regulation
Talal Rashid*
In recent years, some pharmaceutical companies have started
increasing the price of their existing drugs to exorbitant levels.
Often, these drugs are medically necessary for patients, who are
left to take on the high costs of the medicine. One recent example
is Mylan, who raised the price of the EpiPen by four hundred
percent, solely for the profit of its own company and to the
detriment of consumers who rely on the EpiPen. Similar patterns
of drug price increases have occurred in the past and will likely
happen again in the future. This Comment will seek to identify the
common elements of this pattern of increasing drug prices by
looking at the behavior of corporations like Mylan and the way
they operate, and it will assess current approaches to resolving
this issue by looking at the roles of Congress, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
The area of concern—apart from the way patients suffer from
drug price increases—is that even after these companies are
subjected to Congressional hearings to address their increasing
drug prices, receive hefty fines from the FTC, experience bad
press, and draw criticism about the issue of increasing drug
prices, little change is made to resolve this problem.
At the same time, industrialized nations around the world do not
face the issue of increasing drug prices to the extent seen in the
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United States. Three countries—Canada, Switzerland, and
France—have protected their citizens by structuring their
healthcare system in a way that gives pharmaceutical companies
little room to raise drug prices to high levels. These countries
utilize approaches such as implementing a price ceiling,
negotiating with pharmaceutical companies by looking at a drug’s
therapeutic value, and setting a reassessment standard to
periodically check on pharmaceutical companies. To this end, this
Comment will look at these approaches in more detail and will
analyze how they can be applied to the United States’ own
healthcare system in a way that would prevent pharmaceutical
companies from raising the prices of their drugs to unethical
levels and, ultimately, lower the cost of prescription drugs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Picture this: Harry, a retired carpenter, has been taking the same drug
for more than fifty years to treat his nerve disorder. Suddenly, the price of
that drug is quadrupled overnight. Luckily, he is covered by Medicare,
which will cover a portion of the cost that he takes every month. However,
he will now have to pay three times his original monthly out of pocket cost
for the drug. Meanwhile, across the country, Susan, a retired nurse, is
dependent on a multiple sclerosis drug that she has been taking since the
nineties. The company behind that drug has slowly been increasing the
price of that drug over the years and Susan has managed to keep up with
her out of pocket cost for the drug. However, this month the company has
increased the price of the drug once again. Unfortunately, this time, Susan
is no longer able to pay her share of the drug’s cost. She will have to go to
her neurologist and seek a cheaper alternative, though it will not have as
great of relief as the original drug.
These scenarios represent the plight for many Americans: high drug
price increases. Increasing prescription drug prices have been at the center
of much debate for years now. There is no better example of this than the
recent controversy involving the EpiPen. Mylan, the manufacturer behind
the lifesaving EpiPen, was criticized nationally for raising the price of the
drug by four hundred percent.1 Critics often argue that there is no need to
increase the price of these drugs, while drug manufacturers go to great
lengths to justify the price of their drugs. The discussion usually results in
Congress confronting drug manufacturers about their high prices, drug
manufacturers offering their own short–term solutions to avoid bad press,
criticism of the policies of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
their part in handing over a monopoly to many of these companies, and
the Federal Trade Commission fining some of these companies for
anticompetitive behavior. However, all of this does very little to address
the problem of drug price increases. In the end, the press forgets about the
issue until the next public outcry.
This Comment argues that a greater solution is needed to address this
pattern of pharmaceutical drug price increases that is posing real problems.
There is research that shows that the United States pays more for drugs
than many other developed countries.2 Yet, critique of increasing
prescription drug prices rarely focuses on what these other countries are
1
Emily Willingham, Why Did Mylan Hike EpiPen Prices 400%? Because They Could,
FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/sites/emilywillingham/2016/08/21/why-did-mylan-hikeepipen-prices-400-because-they-could/ (last updated Aug. 22, 2016).
2
See Robert Langreth, Blacki Migliozzi, & Ketaki Gokhale, The U.S. Pays a Lot More
for Top Drugs Than Other Countries, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.
bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-drug-prices/.
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doing and what sets them apart from the United States. For many of these
countries, the government keeps drug prices in check by implementing a
price ceiling, negotiating with drug manufacturers, and reassessing
pharmaceutical companies after a certain time period to look at the cost–
effectiveness of their drug. Opponents of the approaches followed in these
countries argue that this government intervention discourages drug
manufacturers from engaging in research and development, which results
in fewer drugs being developed.3 Although this is true to some extent, there
are ways to adopt aspects of these systems to the United States that would
avoid this criticism, while lowering the cost of prescription drugs.
This Comment will focus on the issue of high pharmaceutical drug
price increases by examining Mylan’s EpiPen price controversy and the
actions of other pharmaceutical companies that have also taken part in
price increases and seeks to identify the common elements of the issue, as
well as provide a workable solution to this problem. Part II analyzes the
behavior of the pharmaceutical companies and their role in the United
States’ high drug costs. Part III looks at what is being done to address the
issue by examining the role of Congress, the solutions that are being
offered by pharmaceutical companies, the role of the FDA in handing over
a monopoly to many of these companies, and the role of the FTC in
curbing the harmful behavior of pharmaceutical companies that take part
in anticompetitive behavior and increase the prices of their drugs. Finally,
Part IV suggests a solution to high drug price increases by surveying
government price control models of three developed nations—Canada,
Switzerland, and France—and applies aspects of these models to the
United States, while also addressing critics.

II. THE BEHAVIOR OF THE CORPORATION
Many pharmaceutical companies cite expensive research and
developments costs as the reason behind high drug prices. These
companies argue that because drug discovery can be so costly, they must
raise drug prices to obtain increased profits and reimburse those costs.4
Indeed, the cost to develop a new prescription drug that gains marketing

3

See Kevin A. Hassett, Pharmaceutical Price Controls in OECD Countries, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. (Aug. 3, 2004), https://www.aei.org/publication/pharmaceutical-pricecontrols-in-oecd-countries.
4
Jeffrey Sachs, The Drug That Is Bankrupting America, THE HUFFINGTON POST,
www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-sachs/the-drug-that-is-bankrupt_b_6692340.html
(last updated Apr. 18, 2015).
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approval is around $2.6 billion.5 The high cost of research and
development largely stems from factors such as large clinical trial sizes
and a focus on chronic and degenerative diseases.6
Yet, for some pharmaceutical companies, there is an increase in drug
pricing, but no research and development cost to justify the price increase.
In 2007, Mylan purchased a number of medicines from Merck KGaA,
including the EpiPen auto injector.7 Today, the EpiPen, which has been
around for decades and delivers $1 worth of the hormone epinephrine, has
allowed Mylan to generate a profit of $1 billion per year.8 A detailed look
at drug corporations, like Mylan, exposes the harmful behavior of these
manufacturers, which ideally should give the federal government leverage
in implementing meaningful changes.

A. The Process of Raising Prices
The path to increasing drug prices varies among pharmaceutical
companies. For Mylan, that plan likely started in 2014, when it created a
special, one–time stock grant that would allow its executives to be
rewarded if Mylan’s earnings and stock price met specific goals by the end
of 2018.9 According to health data and analytics company, Truven Health
Analytics, Mylan began increasing the price of the EpiPen soon after
introducing the special grant.10 Price increases for the company went from
twenty–two percent annually to thirty–two percent for 2014 and 2015.11
These figures translate to a price increase from $300 to $600 over a period
of two years for a two–pack of the EpiPen.12
For other companies, increasing drug prices is not a subtle process. In
August 2015, Turing Pharmaceuticals acquired Daraprim, a drug used to
treat potentially fatal parasitic infections, and increased the price from

5

Henry G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Cost to Develop and Win Marketing
Approval For a New Drug Is $2.6 Billion, TUFTS CTR. FOR STUDY OF DRUG DEV. (Nov. 18,
2014), http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/complete_story/pr_tufts_csdd_2014_cost_study.
6
Id.
7
Cynthia Koons & Robert Langreth, How Marketing Turned the EpiPen Into a Billion–
Dollar Business, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2015, 10:00 AM), www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-09-23/how-marketing-turned-the-epipen-into-a-billion-dollar-business.
8
Id.
9
Gretchen Morgenson, EpiPen Price Rises Could Mean More Riches for Mylan
Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/business/atmylan-lets-pretend-is-more-than-a-game.html.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Daniel Kozarich, Mylan’s EpiPen Pricing Crossed Ethical Boundaries, FORTUNE
(Sept. 27, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/27/mylan-epipen-heather-bresch/.
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$13.50 a tablet to $750.13 Similarly, Rodelis Therapeutics acquired
Cycloserine, a drug that treats a highly resistant form of tuberculosis, and
increased the price from $500 for 30 pills to $10,800.14 Valeant
Pharmaceuticals was also criticized when it increased the price of
Glumetza, a diabetes drug, from $572 to $3,432 and then increased it to
$5,148 six weeks later.15 For these companies, acquiring drugs is part of
an investment strategy of buying older drugs and then turning them into
higher–priced specialty drugs.16 Critics, like the Infectious Diseases
Society of America and HIV Medicine Association, have argued that these
sudden price increases are unjustifiable for medically vulnerable patients
in desperate need of these medications.17
The pharmaceutical companies’ response to criticism has generally
been to divert attention away from these practices. In an interview with
CNBC, Mylan’s CEO Heather Bresch blamed the increasing price of the
EpiPen on the health–care system and criticized it for requiring consumers
to pay for both insurance premiums and out–of–pocket prescription
medications that can sometimes reach full retail price.18 In her view, the
system was never intended to make the consumers pay list price.19 Bresch
also emphasized the costs Mylan faces, including the costs of
manufacturing the product, distributing the product, and investing.20 Other
companies like Valeant and Turing have had similar responses, focusing
on distracting critics from the price increases by emphasizing patient
assistance programs and research and development costs.21

13

Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase
-in-a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html.
14
Id.
15
Gretchen Morgenson, How Valeant Cashed In Twice on Higher Drug Prices, N.Y.
TIMES (July 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/31/business/how-valeant-cashed
-in-twice-on-higher-drug-prices.html.
16
See Pollack, supra note 13.
17
Id.
18
Dan Mangan & Anita Balakrishnan, Mylan CEO Bresch: ‘No one’s more frustrated
than me’ about EpiPen price furor, CNBC (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/
08/25/mylan-expands-epipen-cost-cutting-programs-after-charges-of-price-gouging.html
(last updated Aug. 25, 2016, 4:33 PM).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
See Linette Lopez, A murky part of Valeant’s business has suddenly caught everyone’s
attention — and the company can’t be happy about it, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2016),
http://www.businessinsider.com/valeant-patient-assistance-programs-2016-4 (discussing
Valeant’s patient assistance programs and critics questioning why Valeant didn’t just lower
the prices of drugs that were too expensive for patients); see also Heather Long, Here’s
what happened to AIDS drug that spiked 5,000%, CNN MONEY (Aug. 25, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/25/news/economy/daraprim-aids-drug-high-price/index.
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As part of an investigation by Congress’ Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, documents revealed company strategies to deal with
critics opposing price increases.22 For Valeant, the public relations strategy
was to launch a new patient assistance program called the “Valeant
Coverage Plus Program,” which was described as an “opportunity to
expand patient access and utilization while maximizing value for niche
brands.”23 The documents also detailed a public relations approach to
increasing prices for orphan drugs—drugs treating rare conditions—and
managing these price increases carefully to avoid negative press.24 Turing
responded to negative press by reaching out to outside consultants, who
suggested that Turing respond to critics by saying it is investing over sixty
percent of its revenues into research and development.25 One consultant
also suggested announcing a patient assistance program for patients who
cannot access its drugs, which would force critics to shift their focus to the
healthcare industry.26

B. Moving Overseas
In 2014, Mylan bought Abbott Laboratories’ generic drug
manufacturing business for more than $5 billion.27 As a result of that deal,
Mylan moved its headquarters to the Netherlands, which has a corporate
tax of twenty percent, compared to the United States’ thirty–five percent
statutory rate.28 Although this deal allowed Mylan to reduce its tax rate,
nothing changed within the company—Mylan’s operational headquarters
are still located in Pennsylvania, along with its main workforce.29 This
html (“Turing has said it needs the profits on the drug in order to fund research and
development of new drugs.”).
22
See COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 114TH CONG., Documents Obtained
by Comm. from Valeant Pharmaceuticals (2016), available at https://democrats-oversight.
house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/Memo%20on%20Valean
t%20Documents0.pdf.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 114TH CONG., Documents Obtained by
Comm. from Turing Pharmaceuticals (2016), available at https://democrats-oversight.
house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/Memo%20on%20Turing
%20Documents.pdf.
26
Id.
27
Renae Merle, EpiPen maker gave CEO more than $5 million to cover personal U.S.
tax bill, WASH. POST. (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2016/08/30/epipen-maker-gave-ceo-more-than-5-million-to-cover-personal-u-s-taxbill/?tid=a_inl.
28
Id.
29
Michael Hiltzik, Another reason to hate Mylan, which jacked up the price of life–
saving EpiPens: It’s a tax dodger, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016, 10:45 AM), http://www.
latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-mylan-inversion-20160823-snap-story.html.
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strategy is known as tax inversion, a phenomenon that has been around
since the 1980s.30
Through tax inversion, an independent U.S. company can create or
buy a foreign parent company and escape the U.S. tax on worldwide
income.31 This also allows companies to take advantage of interest
deductions for their own affiliates abroad.32 Although Congress tried to
crackdown on tax inversion in 2004, a loophole allowed companies, like
Mylan, to adopt the tax address of foreign acquisitions.33 Tax inversion
allows pharmaceutical companies to grow amid pressure from the
government and insurance companies to control costs and compete with
foreign rivals.34 Bresch argued that before the inversion, Mylan found it
impossible to maintain competitiveness under U.S. tax rules and criticized
the unleveled playing field in the country, which penalizes U.S.–based
companies.35
Tax inversion not only provided Mylan with a way to lower taxes, it
was also a useful business strategy. When its shareholders approved the
Abbott Laboratories acquisition, many overlooked an anti–takeover clause
known as stichting.36 A stichting is a Dutch legal entity that has no
shareholders but may acquire and dispose of assets, grant security, and
provide guarantees.37 Through stichting, Dutch–listed corporations are
allowed to have a separate class of voting shares that allow the holder to
have a fixed dividend, with voting shares being given to a foundation
established at the time the corporation goes public.38
Mylan set up a stichting foundation comprised of a four–man board
that would fight against threats to Mylan’s interests by having voting

30
Zachary Mider, Tax Inversion, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/
tax-inversion (last updated Mar. 2, 2017, 9:35 PM UTC).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Max Nisen, Big Pharma Murdered Tax Inversions, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2016 1:57
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-04-06/big-pharma-ruined-taxinversions-for-everybody.
34
Jonathan D. Rockoff, Why Pharma Is Flocking to Inversions, WALL ST. J. (July 14,
2014, 1:53 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-pharma-is-flocking-to-inversions-1405
360384.
35
See Hiltzik, supra note 29.
36
Jen Wieczner, Why Wall Street loves to hate Mylan’s CEO, FORTUNE (Sept. 11, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/09/11/mylan-ceo-heather-bresch/.
37
Robert A. Profusek et al., Shedding Light on the Dutch “Stichting”: The Originals
and Purpose of an Obscure but Potentially Potent Dutch Entity, JONES DAY (Feb. 2016),
at 1, http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/f4c70f5c-c1b1-4c3b-8141-b515d8eb472c
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6f54fc41-e25d-404f-8420-5fdf6c80ad04/Shedding
%20Light%20on%20the%20Dutch%20Stichting.pdf.
38
Id. at 2.
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shares worth up to fifty percent of the company’s voting rights.39 This
turned out to be useful when Mylan used the stichting to block Teva
Pharmaceuticals’ $40 billion hostile takeover bid for the company, which
would have been accepted by common shareholders.40 Shareholders—
who were in favor of the deal because it would give them a premium of as
much as forty–eight percent over their shares’ value—were told that
Mylan was a stakeholder company, not a shareholder company, and it
would consider the interests of employees, patients, and investors.41 Two
shareholders responded by filing lawsuits that claimed references to the
anti–takeover clause in the Abbott Laboratories’ acquisition were vague
and misleading.42
Mylan was one of the last pharmaceutical companies to take advantage
of tax inversion. These inversions caught the attention of the Obama
administration, which proposed tougher regulations after Abbvie, a
pharmaceutical company, tried to buy Ireland’s Shire Pharmaceuticals in
2014.43 Similarly, U.S–based Pfizer Inc. and Ireland–based Allegan
abandoned their $160 billion merger, which would have allowed Pfizer to
cut its tax bill by an estimated $1 billion annually by moving its company
to Ireland.44 As a result of the U.S. Department of Treasury’s new
regulations, officials argue that tax inversions appear to be largely over.45

C. Reaping the Benefits
Since acquiring the EpiPen and raising its price, Bresch has seen a
compensation increase from more than $2 million to nearly $19 million.46
Similarly, other Mylan executives, including its president and chief
commercial officer, have seen their pay increased.47 Mylan’s stock price
also tripled, increasing from $13.29 in 2007 to a high of $47.59 in 2016.48
39

See Wieczner, supra note 36.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See Nisen, supra note 33.
44
Caroline Humer & Ankur Banerjee, Pfizer, Allergan scrap $160 billion deal after U.S.
tax rule change, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2016, 6:54 AM), www.reuters.com/article/us-allerganm-a-pfizer-idUSKCN0X3188.
45
Kristen Hallam, Cynthia Koons and Zachary Tracer, Pfizer, Allergan $160 Billion
Merger Killed by U.S. Tax Rules, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-06/pfizer-allergan-end-160-billion-merger-amidnew-tax-rules (Membership to Bloomberg BNA is required to view archival articles).
46
Ben Popken, Mylan CEO’s Pay Rose Over 600 Percent as EpiPen Price Rose 400
Percent, NBC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/
mylan-execs-gave-themselves-raises-they-hiked-epipen-prices-n636591.
47
Id.
48
Id.
40
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Gilead Sciences is another company that profited immensely when it
introduced expensive life–saving Hepatitis C medications, such as
Sovaldi.49 Sovaldi costs $84,000 for a twelve–week treatment, while the
manufacturing cost was between $100 to $1,400.50 As a result of the
increasing costs, Gilead’s CEO, John C. Martin, saw his compensation
grow from $32.5 million in 2006 to $192.8 million in 2014.51
Other pharmaceutical companies, like Valeant, make profit from price
increases through price appreciation credits. Drug companies use these
credits to raise the cost wholesalers have to pay for a product that they are
contracted to distribute.52 Under these price appreciation credits, when
Valeant raised the price of a drug, it would receive a credit from
wholesalers that reflected the impact of those price increases on the
wholesalers’ inventory.53 In its fourth quarter for 2015, these credits made
up twenty–five percent, or $138 million, of its $562 million operating cash
flow.54 According to Adam J. Fein, President of Pembroke Consulting and
author of the Drug Channels blog, these credits guaranteed Valeant that it
would retain profit from price increases.55

D. The Role of Advocacy Groups Who Speak for Patients
While pharmaceutical companies have continued to raise drug prices,
patient advocacy groups have remained silent about the issue. Patient
advocacy groups are organizations that provide patient and caregiver–
related education, advocacy, and support services.56 These groups play an
important role in educating the public and lobbying the government to
increase funding for research and treatment, as well as advocating for
legislative changes for their target diseases.57 By holding great influence

49

William Rice and Frank Clemente, Gilead Sciences: Price Gouger, Tax Dodger,
AMERICANS FOR TAX FAIRNESS (July 2016), https://americansfortaxfairness.org/newreport-taxpayer-supported-gilead-sciences-is-price-gouging-the-public-then-dodgingtaxes-on-the-huge-profits/ (follow “investigative report” in the first sentence of the news
report for full document).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
See Morgenson, supra note 9.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Susannah L. Rose, Patient Advocacy Organizations: Institutional Conflicts of
Interest, Trust, and Trustworthiness, J.L. MED. ETHICS 680, 680 (2013), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4107906/ (follow hyperlink next to “doi” at the
top of the HHS Public Access page to reach properly paginated PDF).
57
Katie Thomas, Furor Over Drug Prices Puts Patient Advocacy Groups in Bind, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/business/furor-over-drugprices-puts-patient-advocacy-groups-in-bind.html.
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in Washington DC and having multimillion–dollar budgets, these groups
have all the necessary tools to make a positive impact on drug pricing.58
Critics argue that because patient advocacy groups are funded by the
same pharmaceutical companies that increase drug prices, there is a
conflict of interest.59 For example, the Leukemia and Lymphoma Society
receives $50 million a year from drug makers, which makes up sixteen
percent of their funding.60 Other groups receive up to twenty–percent of
their revenue from drug funding.61 In exchange for these donations, the
patient groups help drug companies by signing up participants for clinical
trials, running financial assistance programs, and lobbying Congress to
approve drugs or implement favorable legislation.62
For these patient advocacy groups, their discussion with
pharmaceutical companies has largely been limited to asking for better
treatments or focusing price discussion on insurance companies.63 When
certain groups have proposed to review even modest plans to combat drug
prices, they have been met with resistance from other patient groups,
members of Congress, as well as pharmaceutical companies that donate to
their group.64 As a result, most remain silent on the issue. Critics have
suggested that these patient advocacy groups must limit the relationship
between fundraisers and policymakers and fully disclose financial
relationships.65 Otherwise, they risk losing their independence and, more
importantly, the public’s trust.66

III. CURRENT APPROACHES TO REMEDYING DRUG PRICE INCREASES
A. The Role of Congress
Congress has responded to the public outcry about high drug prices by
confronting pharmaceutical companies. In 2015, Democratic members of
the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform launched an
Affordable Drug Pricing Task Force to address pharmaceutical companies

58

Id.
Id.
60
Jayne O’Donnell, Patient groups funded by drugmakers are largely mum on high drug
prices, USA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/
01/21/patient-groups-drug-makers-high-drug-prices/79001722/.
61
Id.
62
See Thomas, supra note 57.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
See Rose, supra note 56.
66
Id.
59
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and their pricing strategies.67 Spearheaded by Representative Elijah
Cummings (D–MD), these Task Force members have sought to
understand why companies increase their drug prices so quickly and with
little transparency as to why these drugs have such a high cost.68 Similarly,
the Senate Special Committee on Aging has also held hearings regarding
the sudden increasing prices of medicines that have been on the market for
years.69
The response from companies has varied. In early 2016, the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a hearing with
Valeant Pharmaceuticals, where Committee members accused the
company of ruining the reputation of the pharmaceutical industry.70 In
turn, the company admitted that it bought off–patent medications that had
no generic competition and raised the prices for maximum profit.71
Valeant’s interim CEO Howard Schiller assured the Committee that the
company would be abandoning that method.72
Later that year, the Committee held a hearing with Heather Bresch
after news of Mylan’s aggressive EpiPen pricing strategy came into the
public eye.73 At the hearing, Committee members questioned Bresch about
Mylan’s EpiPen price increases, as well as her pay and other company
practices.74 Bresch responded by defending her company and emphasized
that it has expanded access to EpiPens by distributing them for free at
schools. In her words, Mylan has found a balance between price and access
to the EpiPen.75 As a result of that hearing, Mylan made two promises: to
extend EpiPen’s shelf life from 18 months to two years and to introduce a
$300 generic version of its product.76
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Mylan’s promises are, in fact, not very promising. An extension of the
shelf life of the EpiPen still has no effect on the high cost of the drug.
Furthermore, although a $300 generic EpiPen two–pack sounds like a step
in the right direction, this price is still three times the cost of the drug when
Mylan acquired its rights in 2007.77 As for Valeant, it has still been making
headlines for raising its drug prices, although the company claims the price
hikes are no longer as significant as they were in the past. Last October,
the company raised the prices of several drugs from two to nine–percent
of their original price, which Valeant argued was part of their commitment
to keep drug prices affordable.78 However, that same month, the company
was also criticized for raising the price of a lead poisoning treatment from
a price of $950, at the time it was acquired by Valeant in 2013, to
$27,000.79 Analysts have argued that these price increases lead them to
believe that Valeant still relies on price increases to boost revenue
streams.80
The outcomes of these House Committee hearings highlight how little
help they are in solving the problem of rising drug prices. In addition, these
hearings have not resulted in any legislation that addresses the issue of
drug price increases. Critics have argued that Committee members have
little understanding of drug markets and fail to understand the bigger issue
of overall drug costs.81 According to Ameet Sarpatwari, an instructor at
Harvard Medical School, these hearings only serve as a way to release
public frustration and fail to institute meaningful systemic reform.82

B. Solutions Offered by Pharmaceutical Companies
In response to public scrutiny, pharmaceutical companies have taken
it upon themselves to offer their own solutions. Following backlash over
its price of the EpiPen, Mylan said it would offer instant savings cards
worth $300 to patients who pay full price for the drug out of pocket.83 This
comes-up-emptyaddiction-drugs-under-congressional-state-scrutiny-us-hep-c-drugprices-similar-to-other-countries-216521.
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would reduce the price by fifty percent for these patients who have no
insurance or those who have a high deductible.84 The company also said it
would offer financial assistance to low–income families that would allow
them to receive the EpiPen two–pack for free.85
However, critics have argued that this is simply a public relations fix
that fails to address the high price of the drug. According to them, the
savings cards would only be used by a fraction of the people who use the
EpiPen.86 Furthermore, the high cost of the drug would still be paid by the
insurer, which is subsequently reflected in higher premiums.87 The savings
cards also cannot be used by people without insurance or those enrolled in
government–funded health programs, like Medicaid.88 America’s Health
Insurance Plans, the leading health insurance lobbying group, said this
tactic of implementing patient assistance programs and co–pay support has
been used by pharmaceutical companies in the past in an attempt to cover
price hikes.89
This exact strategy was used in the past by Valeant Pharmaceuticals
when it was in the public eye after its price increases. In 2015, Valeant
struck a deal with Walgreens to distribute thirty of its products at generic
prices, reducing their prices from five to ninety–five percent.90 However,
the next year, the company began charging those patients a co–pay of $35
on certain drugs.91 Opponents of this strategy argued that Valeant was
refusing to lower drug prices and was the same company in a new
disguise.92 Similarly, Mylan’s solution of creating a savings card and a
financial assistance program does little to help the problem of an expensive
EpiPen. Unfortunately, these approaches only put a temporary band–aid
on the issue without seeking to fix the underlying issues.
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C. The Role of the Food and Drug Administration
In 1984, Congress passed the Hatch–Waxman Act, which governs
today’s generic drug approval process.93 The Hatch–Waxman Act was
intended to accomplish two goals.94 The first goal was to encourage the
development of new drugs by allowing innovator drug manufacturers to
have patent protection and market exclusivity for a certain time period,
allowing them to regain their investment in the development of the drug.95
Second, Congress wanted to make sure that, once that patent protection
and market exclusivity period was over, consumers were able to access
less expensive, generic versions of those innovator drugs.96
The latter goal has become the subject of much debate, with critics
arguing that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has not done its job
in assuring that generic drugs are reaching the market in an efficient
manner.97 There is no better example of this than the EpiPen, which is an
off–patent drug with no generic competitor.98 According to a report by the
Kaiser Family Foundation, as of July 1st 2016, the FDA had 4,036 generic
drug applications awaiting approval, with the average approval time being
forty–seven months.99 However, the FDA’s approval process is not a new
problem.100 Beginning in 2012, the FDA’s generic backlog became such a
big issue that the government began charging user fees to generic
manufacturers to provide funds to speed up the process.101 As a result of
these resources, the FDA moved the Office of Generic Drugs to the FDA’s
main campus, hired an additional 1,000 employees, and replaced the
office’s information technology system.102 The FDA argues that this will
allow it to reduce the backlog of pending applications and the time
required to review generic drug applications for safety.103
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Nonetheless, critics are skeptical about whether these changes will
truly result in a faster approval time for generics. Last year, U.S Senator
Tom Cotton (R–Ark) wrote a letter to the FDA to complain about there
being a decrease in approvals, but an increase in the time it takes the
agency to review applications.104 Similarly, the Association for Accessible
Medicines, which educates policymakers about the role of generics in the
healthcare system,105 has said it is cautious about whether there will be an
improvement and will wait to see if the FDA’s actions translate to more
generics being approved.106
As for the EpiPen, there is some hope that it will face generic
competition in the future, with Teva Pharmaceuticals due to release a
generic version of the drug by late 2017 or early 2018.107 Previously in
2016, Teva’s application for a generic version of the EpiPen was rejected
by the FDA due to “certain major deficiencies.” The FDA’s delay in
bringing Teva’s generic EpiPen to the market allowed Mylan to avoid a
large decline in sales.108 The effect that a generic EpiPen will have on the
price of Mylan’s EpiPen remains to be seen. For now, one thing is for
certain—the FDA has done a disservice to consumers by failing to
introduce few, if any, generic competitors into the market for drugs like
the EpiPen. Since many of these branded drugs have little generic
competition,109 the pharmaceutical companies behind these drugs don’t
have much of an incentive to reduce the cost of these drugs. As a result,
the FDA has essentially handed over a monopoly to these pharmaceutical
companies, who control that specific drug’s market and are left to their
free will to raise prices.

D. The Role of the Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is another governmental
agency that has a significant role in addressing increasing drug prices. The
goal of the FTC is to protect customers against business practices that are
104
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anticompetitive, to allow consumers to have knowledge about the
competitive practices between corporations, and to allow consumers to
have a choice between products.110 When it comes to drug price increases,
the FTC does not have any power to force a manufacturer to regulate its
drug prices.111 However, the FTC can protect consumers when a price
increase is the result of anticompetitive behavior.112 For example, if there
is an illegal anticompetitive agreement between drug manufacturers to
increase prices or exclude a drug manufacturer from competing in the
market, then the FTC can step in and penalize those who are taking part in
the illegal activity.113
One recent example of the FTC’s authority in the pharmaceutical
sector is the case of Mallinckrodt, an Ireland–based drug manufacturer. In
2017, Mallinckrodt had to pay a $100 million settlement with the FTC
after the agency concluded that Questcor, a subsidiary of the drug maker,
monopolized a drug and then raised its price.114 According to the FTC,
Questcor was a major seller of a treatment for infantile spasms and
multiple sclerosis and purchased the U.S. rights to a rival medicine from
another pharmaceutical company.115 Consequently, Questcor no longer
had competitors for its own medicine.116 As a result of its market control,
Questcor began raising the price of its drug and this resulted in close to $1
billion in annual sales.117 Mallinckrodt then acquired Questcor and
continued to increase the price of the drug.118 Eventually, this caught the
attention of the FTC, who fined Mallinckrodt $100 million for maintaining
the monopoly.119 Furthermore, the FTC required Mallinckrodt to sell off
the U.S. rights to the competing drug that Questcor had bought.120
Based on the FTC’s handling of the Mallinckrodt case, the FTC seems
to be an important figure in the discussion of increasing drug prices. The
FTC’s ability to monitor drug companies and penalize those who take part
110
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in anticompetitive behavior is a useful resource to have when
manufacturers take part in this illegal activity. At the same time, the fact
that the FTC’s role is limited to overseeing anticompetitive behavior
means that the agency alone is not enough to curb drug price increases.
There has been discussion that although the FTC is able to obtain large
settlements, these settlements pale in comparison to the profit made by the
drug manufacturer.121 For example, Mallinckrodt was faced with a $100
million fine for monopolizing a drug that brought in one third of its $3.4
billion net sales in 2016.122 Since these fines are not a huge loss for the
manufacturer, the company often repeats the illegal behavior and many of
them have been repeat offenders of anticompetitive behavior.123
A testament to these critics’ concerns is Mylan itself. In 2000, the FTC
found that Mylan had agreed to exclusive supply contracts with three
suppliers of an ingredient used in manufacturing two anti–anxiety drugs.124
The exclusive supply contracts prevented Mylan’s competitors from
obtaining the ingredients necessary to make the drugs.125 Following this,
Mylan obtained market exclusivity and began raising the price of its own
anti–anxiety drugs.126 As a result of this anticompetitive behavior, the FTC
sued Mylan and the three suppliers, resulting in a $100 million
settlement.127 In 2017, the FTC again opened a preliminary investigation
into Mylan after suspecting that the company violated antitrust laws by
making minor changes to the EpiPen, which prevented lower–priced
competitors from entering the market.128 The FTC is concerned about
whether Mylan extended its patent by changing dosage levels and if the
company entered into any agreements to delay market introduction of
cheaper versions of the EpiPen.129 The results of the FDA’s preliminary
investigation, however, remain to be seen.130

121

Id.
Id.
123
Id.
124
Friedman, supra note 111.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
David McLaughlin et al., Mylan Faces U.S. Antitrust Investigation on EpiPen,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0130/mylan-faces-u-s-antitrust-investigation-on-epipen-practices.
129
Id.
130
Id.
122

2017]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

147

IV. A SOLUTION IN GOVERNMENT PRICE CONTROL
The increasing cost of drugs such as the EpiPen speaks to the bigger
issue of whether consumers should be willing to accept any price these
pharmaceutical companies present to them. According to a study
performed by researchers from Harvard Medical School, in 2013, per
capita spending on prescription drugs in the United States was higher than
nineteen other industrialized nations.131 Statistics such as this emphasize
how important it is to look at the healthcare systems of other countries and
see what they are doing differently. An analysis of the approaches taken
in three industrialized nations—Canada, Switzerland, and France—
reveals that the governments of these countries have a greater role in
regulating drug prices by negotiating prices with pharmaceutical
companies, as well setting price ceilings to prevent companies from raising
prices to egregious levels. More importantly, although these countries
have healthcare systems that are different from the United States’—one
example being universal healthcare—many aspects of the approaches
taken by these countries can still be implemented in the U.S.

A. Models in Foreign Countries
1. Canada
In Canada, drug prices are monitored by the Patented Medicine Prices
Review Board (PMPRB).132 Created in 1987, the PMPRB acts as an
independent, quasi–judicial body that enforces sanctions and price
reductions for patented pharmaceutical products.133 The PMPRB limits its
power to regulating the price of patented drugs during the duration of their
patent time period.134 The Board makes sure that drug prices are not
excessive by comparing the price of the drug to the prices of existing drugs
131
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in Canada or to prices in seven of the world’s dominant markets, such as
France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.135 Under
the Board’s existing rules, the cost of a patented drug cannot exceed the
highest price of the same drug in the seven countries.136
As for new drugs, the Board assesses the price of these drugs by using
a three–tiered scale that evaluates the degree of innovation.137 Under the
first category, drugs that are a new dosage or form of an existing medicine
are considered to have an excessive price if the price does not have a
reasonable relationship to the average price of that medicine in similar
dosage forms.138 Under the second category, drugs that are considered to
be a breakthrough or a big improvement over similar existing medicines
are excessive if the price is higher than that of comparable products in its
therapeutic class and the international median price of that medicine.139
Under the final category, drugs that provide little to moderate therapeutic
advantage over similar medicines are considered to have an excessive
price if the price is higher than similar products in the Canadian market or
that drug’s international median price.140
By regulating prices through an agency like PMPRB, Canada has been
able to lower its drug prices closer to median international prices.141 For
example, in 1987, Canadian prices for patented medicines were higher
than the international median price by more than twenty–percent.142
Following the creation of the PMPRB, the prices began to decrease in the
early nineties and eventually stabilized to ten–percent below the median
price in seven comparable countries.143 Finally, in 2005, the prices of drugs
were eight–percent lower than the median price of seven comparable
countries.144
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2. Switzerland
In Switzerland, the population is covered by a universal basic health
insurance plan that includes drug coverage.145 Drug coverage under the
basic health insurance plan is limited to pharmaceuticals that have gone
through an assessment process and are included in a Specialty List.146 The
Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH) regulates the inclusion of these
drugs in the Switzerland’s universal health insurance plan and oversees
the price of covered drugs, whether on or off–patent.147 A drug is covered
if it’s approved by Swissmedic (Switzerland’s equivalent of the FDA),
considered effective and appropriate, and has value–for–money.148
When determining value–for–money, the FOPH compares at the
manufacturer’s proposed price to the manufacturer’s set price abroad, the
drug’s therapeutic value compared to other similar medications, and the
drug’s daily cost or cost per cure compared to similar medications.149 If
the drug produces a therapeutic effect at the lowest possible cost, it is
determined to be value–for–money.150 Similar factors are looked at when
the OFSP establishes a maximum price for newly listed drugs, including
the price of the drug in foreign countries, such as Germany and the United
Kingdom, the effectiveness of the new drug, and research and
development costs.151 This same assessment is performed after the patent
for the drug expires.152
As a result of its price regulation, there is now a smaller gap between
the price of drugs in Switzerland and other European countries.153 At the
same time, studies also show that the cost of Swiss drugs is still greater
than other European countries because the prices of drugs are either set
higher in Switzerland or the prices decrease in other countries after the
drug launches in Switzerland.154 Nonetheless, after the regulation of drug
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prices in the late nineties, Swiss drug prices are no longer significantly
higher than other comparable countries.155

3. France
In France, the general population is also covered by universal health
insurance.156 The country follows a step–by–step process for covering
prescription medicines and setting their price.157 Following approval to be
sold in the market, the drug is then evaluated by the Transparency
Committee, which assesses the therapeutic value of the drug and compares
it with existing drugs.158 When assessing the therapeutic value of the drug,
the Transparency Committee categorizes the drug into five categories:
major improvement, significant improvement, moderate improvement,
minor improvement, and no improvement.159 The Committee is also free
to re–evaluate the drug every five years or earlier.160 When determining a
drug’s category, the Committee looks at factors such as the drug’s
effectiveness and possible side effectives, its medical benefit, seriousness
of the condition it is treating, its preventative or symptomatic properties
and its impact on the public’s health.161
After the Committee evaluates the therapeutic value, the Health
Product Pricing Committee then negotiates the price of the drug with the
manufacturer and forms a contract that includes rebates and price re–
evaluations.162 The system of categorizing drugs directly impacts the level
of co–payment and the price negotiations, which depend on a drug’s
effectiveness.163 For example, the reimbursement rates for drugs range
from thirty–five percent to sixty–five percent.164 As a result, a drug that
falls into one of the first three categories is likely to have a higher
reimbursement rate than a drug in the fourth or fifth category.165 The
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remaining cost is covered for most French citizens, who have
complementary health insurance.166
The Pricing Committee also sets a maximum price ceiling for
medicines that are used for outpatient care and expensive hospital
medicines, with innovative drugs being compared with prices in similar
countries.167 For these reasons, the final price of a drug is subject to various
factors, including the category it is placed in and the price in similar
countries.168 Furthermore, the contract between the drug manufacturer and
the Pricing Committee also includes a payback procedure.169 The
country’s parliament approves a budget for the public health insurance
system and defines a rate for its pharmaceutical expenditure.170 When the
pharmaceutical expenditure exceeds that rate, the drug manufacturer must
offset that cost through a rebate.171 These rebates are based on, among
other factors, how innovative each company’s product is and its share of
the increase in expenditure.172
Finally, due to legislation that places importance on cost–effectiveness
data, manufacturers are sometimes required to produce additional data
after a certain time period.173 This data is used to reassess the drug’s
therapeutic value by looking at the drug’s added value related to
effectiveness, which is based on the standard used by the Transparency
Committee in categorizing drugs.174 This reassessment can result in price
changes, such as a reduction in the reimbursement rates for companies.175
However, innovative drugs that fall within the first three categories and
offer a significant improvement receive the benefit of having a stable price
for five years.176 Overall, as a result of its regulation of drug prices, France
has been able to maintain drug prices at a lower level than comparable
countries, like Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom.177
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B. Applying these Methods to the United States
1. Setting a Price Ceiling for Off–Patent Medications
One of the main complaints in the discussion of pharmaceutical drug
pricing is the increase in the price of drugs that have been on the market
for years.178 Often, the list price for many of these existing drugs rises ten
percent or more year after year.179 One solution to this problem would be
for the United States to set up an independent board, as seen in Canada,
which would monitor the prices of off–patent medications. In Canada, the
PMPRB monitors the price of patent medications by comparing them to
seven of the world’s most industrialized nations.180 Similarly, the United
States should monitor the prices of off–patent drugs by comparing the
prices of these drugs to those in seven countries that have dominant
markets like the U.S. Under this system, the U.S. would prevent drug
manufacturers from raising the price of an off–patent drug higher than the
highest price of a comparable drug in any of the seven countries. Since the
United States ranks as paying the highest cost for drugs in the world, with
the difference being substantial, this system could lead to significant
changes.181 By implementing such a board, drug manufacturers of
medications would no longer be able to raise prices to high levels.
Critics of a price control structure argue that a system that regulates
the price of patented drugs impedes innovation by discouraging research
and development of new medications.182 A report by the U.S. Department
of Commerce concluded that countries that set price controls on new drugs
reduce company compensation to levels closer to direct production costs,
leaving less revenue for research and development.183 As a result, a
reduction in research and development impedes health benefits for the
citizens of those countries.184 Furthermore, another study concluded that if
countries with price controls on patented drugs were to remove those
regulations, research and development expenditure would increase from
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$17 billion to $22 billion.185 In turn, this would result in newer drugs being
developed.186
However, the price ceiling system that is being argued for in this
Comment is different from those seen in other countries, like Canada.
Under the United States’ price ceiling, the independent board would not
set a price ceiling for patented drugs. As stated earlier in this Comment,
under the Hatch–Waxman Act, innovator drug manufacturers are given a
patent exclusivity period to regain their research and development costs.187
For these reasons, a price control system in the U.S would focus
exclusively on off–patent medications. The idea behind this is that if a
medication is off–patent, it is past its patent exclusivity period. As a result,
the manufacturer of that drug has regained much its research and
development cost during the exclusivity period. By only regulating the
price of the drug once it is no longer patent–protected, this would satisfy
critics who argue that these price controls discourage the development of
newer drugs by reducing a manufacturer’s overall revenue.
Many of the drugs that have been subjected to high price increases are
those that have expired patents.188 By implementing a price control
through the creation of an independent board, like the PMPRB, the United
States would reduce the price of off–patent drugs and prevent companies
from marking up drugs that have been on the market for years. As seen in
Canada, regulation of patented drugs has allowed prices to stabilize below
the median price in comparable countries. If the U.S. were to follow the
same system, but only for off–patent medications, like the EpiPen, there
would likely be a similar result here.

2. Increasing the Negotiation Power of the Government
One of the other areas of conflict in the conversation about drug price
increases is the need for an expansion in the U.S. government’s ability to
negotiate drug prices with manufacturers. Currently, Medicaid is able to
negotiate drug prices with manufacturers directly through the Medicaid
Drug Rebate Program.189 Under this program, manufacturers enter into
rebate agreements with the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services and pay a rebate when a drug is paid for under a state
185
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plan.190 The amount of the rebate is determined by factors such as whether
it is an innovator drug, non–innovator drug, or a drug that is a new
formulation of a brand name drug, among others.191 For example, an
innovator drug manufacturer has to provide a minimum rebate of 23.1%
of the average price that the manufacturer receives for sale per unit.192 As
for Medicare Part D, which covers prescription drug coverage, Congress
has prohibited the government from negotiating drug prices for Medicare
beneficiaries.193 Instead, this negotiating power is given to private insurers
that have a contract with Medicare, who also obtain rebates.194
One way to address increasing drug prices would be for Congress to
repeal part of the Medicare Modernization Act, which prohibits the
government from negotiating drug prices for Medicare Part D
beneficiaries.195 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has argued that
if the federal government were to negotiate lower prices for Medicare
beneficiaries, it would have a harmful effect on federal spending.196 The
CBO based this conclusion on its understanding that the government
would not be able to obtain greater discounts than those obtained by the
private plans that have a contract with Medicare.197 Furthermore, the CBO
has argued that private plans compete for beneficiaries based on cost and
coverage, which means they face the risk of paying for costs that exceed
their projections.198 Other opponents have a similar view, arguing that the
government would not be able to obtain greater discounts than the private
plans already do.199
However, there has been great support for allowing the government to
negotiate drug prices for Part D beneficiaries. Proponents of this plan
argue that if the government was able to negotiate drug prices on behalf of
Medicare Part D beneficiaries, it would obtain deeper discounts.200 These
190
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proponents argue that discounts would be especially beneficial for high–
priced drugs that have no competition, which includes many of the drugs
that have seen high price increases.201 These supporters are correct and the
federal government should be allowed to negotiate drug prices for
Medicare Part D and obtain the same rebates that are obtained through
Medicaid. For example, the rebates obtained by Medicare reduce spending
on drugs by nineteen percent, while the rebates obtained by Medicaid
reduce spending by forty–five percent.202 By negotiating on behalf of
Medicare Part D beneficiaries, as does Medicaid, the government could
likely be able to reduce spending on drugs.
Furthermore, under Medicaid, drug companies must pay a greater
rebate if the price of their drug rises faster than the general inflation.203
Since many of these drug prices do end up rising faster than general
inflation, these rebates account for more than half of the rebates paid to
Medicaid.204 A similar negotiation under Medicare Part D would expand
these discounts to an additional group consisting of 30 million older
Americans and individuals with disabilities.205
Critics of high drug prices also complain about the lack of
transparency when it comes to drug price increases.206 Many of these
critics argue that the federal government should have access to the
information that the manufacturer believes justifies the high cost.207
Transparency for newly introduced drugs includes payments
manufacturers make to doctors for research, meals and entertainment, and
consulting and giving promotional speeches.208 In addition, manufacturers
have had to disclose the results of their clinical trials.209
201
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States have also taken it upon themselves to address drug price
increases and the lack of transparency. In 2016, Vermont was the first state
to require drug manufacturers to give an explanation for large price
increases.210 The state requires officials to identify drugs that saw price
increases of at least fifteen–percent in the previous year and over fifty–
percent over the last five years.211 Following this assessment, the state
requires Vermont’s attorney general to reach out to drug manufacturers
and seek explanations for the increases.212 As of now, the law is limited to
transparency and doesn’t give Vermont the power to cap prices that are
excessive, but the state is allowed to fine manufacturers who don’t provide
information about their price increases.213 However, outside of this
Vermont law, when it comes to price increases of existing drugs, there is
little transparency about how drug manufacturers implement new
prices.214
To address the issue of transparency and expand the federal
government’s negotiation power for both Medicaid and Medicare Part D,
an evaluation process should be instituted, like that in Sweden and France.
Both of these countries evaluate a drug by analyzing its therapeutic value,
comparing them to existing drugs, and/or looking at research and
development costs. The government, negotiating for Medicaid and
Medicare Part D, should also look at these factors by requiring
participating drug manufacturers to disclose such information to them
when seeking to be covered by these plans. For example, if a drug offers
a high therapeutic value, an increase in the drug rebate should be obtained
so that patients are able to have access to these medications at a lower
price. At the same time, research and development would also be factored
into the rebate paid by companies. By factoring in the cost of research and
development of a new medicine, drug manufacturers who spend a large
amount of money on research and development and create innovative
medicines with a high therapeutic value would pay a lower rebate
percentage. Factoring in the cost of research and development would also
address the argument that negotiating drugs impedes the creation of new
medicines by discouraging research and development.215 By rewarding
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drug manufacturers with a lower rebate amount, this increased negotiating
power of the government would likely not get in the way of the creation
of new, innovating drugs.
In addition, following the evaluation process, the government should
use a reassessment standard, such as the kind seen in France. In France,
following a certain time period after drug prices are set, manufacturers are
sometimes required to produce additional cost–effectiveness data.216 The
Transparency Committee uses this data to reassess the drug, which can
impact its price and the rebate the manufacturer obtains.217 The United
States should implement a similar reassessment standard for drugs after
the government’s original negotiations for Medicaid and Medicare Part D.
Currently, under Medicaid, a drug manufacturer has to pay a higher
rebate if the price of their drug rises faster than general inflation.218
Although this is a useful way to reprimand drug manufacturers for
increasing the price of their drugs, a reassessment standard can be a better
way to hold manufacturers more accountable for price increases. A
reassessment would be limited to those drug manufacturers whose
products have seen high price increases following the initial negotiations.
Under this reassessment standard, the United States would require these
drug manufacturers to justify why they raise the price of their medicines
and explain how they come up with the new price. Based on the
information received by drug manufacturers, the government would then
determine how much of a higher rebate amount the manufacturer should
pay for its price increase. At the same time, the information received by
manufacturers would have a positive effect on the public’s discussion of
drug price increases.
As stated in this Comment, drug manufacturers have been guarded
about why they increase the price of their drugs. By requiring these
manufacturers to release that information once they have implemented a
high price increase, the public would finally know their reasoning behind
these increases. This can also lead to a more thoughtful dialogue between
manufacturers and the public than the kind seen in the past, such as at
congressional hearings. Furthermore, a reassessment might act as a
deterrence by making drug manufacturers hesitant about raising prices,
since manufacturers will know that they will be required to disclose
reassessment data once their drugs have reached a high price.
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V. CONCLUSION
When it comes to increasing prescription drug prices, there is a great
need for reform in the pharmaceutical industry. However, there is no
perfect fix. A solution requires carefully evaluating all of the players
affecting the cost of drugs, while keeping in mind that the United States
has a healthcare system that is different from those seen in other countries
around the world. Furthermore, reform should strike a delicate balance of
pleasing both the public and drug manufacturers. One such solution to high
drug prices is a system that sets a price ceiling for off–patent medications,
increases the negotiation power of the U.S. government by allowing the
government to negotiate for Medicare Part D beneficiaries, and requires
greater transparency when manufacturers seek to have their drugs covered
under Medicaid and Medicare Part D. Although this will not completely
alleviate the problem of drug price increases, it is a step in the right
direction and will likely result in lower drug prices. By increasing the price
of their drugs, pharmaceutical companies have directly impacted the
ability of consumers to access drugs and have forced them to seek out
alternatives. Ultimately, the United States government must recognize this
widespread problem and prioritize the livelihood of Americans across the
country.

